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RULE 55: WHY BROADLY INTERPRETING
"OTHERWISE DEFEND" PROTECTS A
DILIGENT PARTY'S RIGHTS AND
ENCOURAGES AN ORDERLY AND
EFFICIENT JUDICIAL SYSTEM
JESSICA RUOFF
When a defendant fails to answer a complaint, it is easy to
say that a default should be entered against that defendant.
However, when the defendant has answered the complaint, but
fails to participate in the proceedings that follow-including
pretrial conferences, discovery, and trial-the line becomes
blurrier on whether a default should be entered. Consider this
scenario: The defendant answers the complaint but fails to
submit a pretrial brief. Once the trial date is set, the defendant
and his attorney do not appear. The plaintiff, having already
spent a considerable amount of time and money on this case,
moves for entry of default. A default is entered against the
defendant. The plaintiff is relieved because his case has some
finality.
This scenario implicates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(a), which states that a default must be entered against a
party that "fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend."1 While failing to
answer a complaint is within the meaning of failing to plead,2 the
question of whether a default should be entered becomes more
difficult when the defendant 3 has answered the complaint but
t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2014, St. John's
University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Ettie Ward for her guidance
and support in completing this Note.
I FED. R. CIv. P. 55(a).
2 An answer to a complaint is considered a pleading under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
' While typically a default is entered against a defendant, a default can be
entered against a plaintiff if the plaintiff "fail[s] to plead or otherwise defend" a
counterclaim. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2682 (3d ed. 1998). For simplicity's sake, this Note refers to the
defendant as the one against whom a default or default judgment is entered.
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subsequently fails to appear at trial or a pretrial conference. On
one hand, it seems fair to the plaintiff that the default be entered
against the defendant. On the other hand, the defendant has
shown, through its actions, an interest in defending against the
lawsuit and has merely missed the trial date or a pretrial
deadline. At the same time, however, to ensure an expeditious
and efficient judicial system, it is important to deter undue delay
where it can be prevented.
Rule 55(a) is the first step of a two-step process for entering
a default judgment under Rule 55.4 A court clerk must enter a
default against a party that "has failed to plead or otherwise
defend."5 While failure to plead is well recognized as a failure to
answer any one of the pleadings found in Rule 7(a),6 the federal
circuit courts have inconsistently interpreted the words
"otherwise defend."7 A majority of circuits have interpreted
"otherwise defend" broadly, while a minority of circuits have
interpreted this language narrowly.
This Note argues that a uniform interpretation of "otherwise
defend" is needed. Part I of this Note discusses the history and
purpose of Rule 55, the procedure for entries of default and
default judgment, and other alternatives to Rule 55 default
judgments. Part II of this Note examines how the language
"otherwise defend" has been interpreted differently by the federal
circuit courts. Part III of this Note argues that the majority's
broad interpretation of "otherwise defend" should be adopted as
the uniform interpretation because it is supported by statutory
interpretation and the underlying purpose of Rule 55.
4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
6 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3. The types of pleadings include an answer to
a complaint, an answer to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a third-party
complaint, an answer to a third-party complaint, and, if the court orders one, a reply
to an answer. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
I See infra Part II (discussing the circuit split on the interpretation of
"otherwise defend").
" See infra Part I.A-B (discussing the broad interpretation of "otherwise
defend" adopted by a majority of the circuit courts and the narrow interpretation
adopted by a minority of the circuit courts).
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I. HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 55
A. The History and Purpose of Default Judgments
Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in
1938, a default judgment could be entered in law or in equity.' In
law, a default judgment was referred to as a decree "nil dicit."10
A decree "nil dicit" could be entered when the defendant failed to
plead, regardless of whether the defendant appeared or not.1 ' In
equity, a default judgment was referred to as a decree "pro
confesso.""2 Under the original Federal Equity Rules, a decree
"pro confesso" could be entered against a properly served
defendant if the defendant did not appear within the time
specified, or did appear, but failed to plead, demur, or answer the
bill within a specified time. 13 Once the decree was entered, a
defendant was barred from alleging anything in opposition to the
decree or questioning correctness on appeal, unless the defendant
could show that the bill was erroneously and improperly
granted.'
4
The enactment of Rule 55 in 1938 represents the joining of
the decree "nil dicit" and decree "pro confesso."'5 A substantial
portion of the text of Rule 55 came from Federal Equity Rules 16
and 17.16 Federal Equity Rule 16 provided that "[i]t shall be the
duty of the defendant ... to file his answer or other defense to
the bill in the clerk's office" and that "li]n default thereof the
9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681. An early Supreme Court case, Thomson
v. Wooster, equated a decree "pro confesso" in equity to a decree "nil dicit" at law. See
114 U.S. 104, 111 (1885) ("[T]he method in equity of taking a bill pro confesso is
consonant to the rule and practice of the courts at law, where, if the defendant
makes default by nil dicit, judgment is immediately given in debt....").
10 See Arthur J. Park, Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment
Framework, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 155, 157 (2011).
11 Id.
12 WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 3, § 2681.
13 Id.
14 Id.
'5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee's note; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 2681.
16 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
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plaintiff may... take an order as of course that the bill be taken
pro confesso."'17 Federal Equity Rule 17 provided the procedure
for setting aside a default or for entering a final decree.'"
The text of Rule 55 has remained essentially the same since
its promulgation in 1938, except for some stylistic changes.1 9
Prior to the stylistic changes in 2007, Rule 55(a) stated: "When a
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules
and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk shall enter the party's default." 0  The language, "as
provided by these rules," was deleted from Rule 55(a) to preclude
an entry of default where a party engaged in an act that showed
intent to defend but that the rules did not specifically account
for.2 ' The advisory committee noted that "[aicts that showed an
intent to defend ... frequently prevented [an entry of] default,"
and the change in the text made it clear that acts that showed
intent to defend, whether addressed by the rules or not, should
prevent entry of default.22 The advisory committee's note,
however, did not specifically address what those acts were.
A default judgment's purpose is to protect the diligent
party's rights.23 When the adversary process is halted due to an
essentially unresponsive defendant, a default judgment is
available,24  protecting a plaintiff from "undue delay-
17 Id.
18 See id. Federal Equity Rule 17 stated:
When the bill is taken pro confesso the court may proceed to a final decree
at any time after the expiration of thirty days after the entry of the order
pro confesso, and such decree shall be deemed absolute, unless the court
shall, at the same term, set aside the same, or enlarge the time for filing
the answer, upon cause shown upon motion and affidavit. No such motion
shall be granted, unless upon the payment of the costs of the plaintiff up to
that time, or such part thereof as the court shall deem reasonable, and
unless the defendant shall undertake to file his answer within such time as
the court shall direct, and submit to such other terms as the court shall
direct, for the purpose of speeding the cause.
Id. n.12.
19 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee's note.
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (2006) (amended 2007) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109HPRT31308/pdf/CPRT-109HPRT31308.pdf.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 55 advisory committee's note; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 2681.
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee's note.
23 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
24 See id.
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harassment."2 I For example, in New York v. Green,26 the
defendants never answered the complaint, and a default
judgment was entered against them. In deciding whether to
vacate the default judgment, the court assessed the defendants'
conduct in light of the basic purpose of the default judgment and
found that the defendants "willfully" failed to file an answer as
part of a scheme to delay the proceedings. 28  Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's refusal to vacate the default
judgment.29
Further, the threat of entry of default is a deterrent to
defendants that choose delay as part of their litigation strategy.30
Accordingly, the entry of default allows a court to enforce
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in
turn, allows the court to maintain an "orderly and efficient
judicial system. '31 This enforcement is consistent with how the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "should be construed and
administered"-"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."3 2
While an underlying purpose exists for entering default
judgments, there is also a strong competing public policy in favor
of resolving disputes on the merits.3 As a result, "modern courts
do not favor default judgments,"34 and "any doubts usually will be
resolved in favor of the defaulting party."" To reconcile these
conflicting notions, the goals of justice and efficiency are weighed
against the policy of deciding matters on the merits. 6 However,
25 Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996).
26 420 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005).
27 Id. at 103.
21 See id. at 108 ("[T]heir failure to file an answer was a 'part of an overall plan
to delay the proceedings ... .'" (quoting New York v. Green, No. 01-CV-196A, 2004
WL 1375555, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004))).
29 Id. at 110.
30 H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31 Pikofsky v. Jem Oil, 607 F. Supp. 727, 733 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
33 See Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996).
34 Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011).
35 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
36 See Adam Owen Glist, Note, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the
Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 765 (2000).
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courts do recognize that the plaintiff must be protected and
courts will enter a default when the plaintiff is "faced with
interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights."37
B. The Procedure for Entering a Default and Default Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-step
process for entering a default judgment .3  The first step is to
obtain an entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a). 9 Under Rule
55(a), the clerk must enter a default if a party "has failed to
plead or otherwise defend."4" The court clerk enters the default
once the non-defaulting party shows failure to plead or otherwise
defend through an "affidavit or otherwise."41 A court also has the
power to enter a default in its discretion.42 This first step
"formalizes a judicial recognition that [the] defendant
has ... admitted liability to the plaintiff."43 The entry of default
only establishes liability and "is not an admission of damages."44
Moreover, "a defendant's default does not in itself warrant the
court entering a default judgment."45
The second step is to obtain a judgment by default pursuant
to Rule 55(b).46 Once a default is entered, the plaintiff can
request an entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b).47 Under
Rule 55(b)(1), a clerk must enter a default judgment if the
3' District of Columbia v. Butler, 713 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2010). A
plaintiff can be faced with uncertainty as to its rights when the defendant is totally
unresponsive. See id. For example, in Butler, the defendant failed to plead or
otherwise respond to the complaint in a timely manner. Id. at 63. The court found
that the entry of default against the defendant was proper, because the defendant
failed to request to set aside the default or even suggest a meritorious defense. See
id. at 64.
38 See FED. R. CIv. P. 55; New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005);
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).
'9 See Green, 420 F.3d at 104.
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
41 Id.
42 See Beller & Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 22 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
since the court has the power to enter a default judgment, it impliedly has the power
to perform the ministerial function of entering a default).
43 City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir.
2011).
44 Id. (citing Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 83 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009)).
45 Bonifacio v. Ne. Acquistions Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323 (S.D. Fla.
2011) (citing Tyco Fire & Sec. LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x. 860, 863 (lth Cir.
2007)).
4 See New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
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plaintiffs claim is for a "sum certain."48 If the plaintiffs claim is
not for a "sum certain," the plaintiff must apply to the court for a
default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2).49  Once the plaintiff
applies, the court may enter a default judgment and has the
authority to hold a hearing to "conduct an accounting; determine
the amount of damages; establish the truth of any allegation by
evidence; or investigate any other matter."5 Unlike other final
judgments, a default judgment "must not differ in kind from, or
exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings."51
In determining whether a default judgment should be
entered under Rule 55(b)(2), the court is required to exercise
sound discretion. 52  The court can consider factors such as
"whether the default is largely technical, whether the plaintiff
has been substantially prejudiced by the delay, whether grounds
for default are clearly established, and whether the [c]ourt thinks
it later would be obliged to set aside the default on defendant['s]
motion."53 Additional factors a court can consider are the amount
of money at stake in the action, the likelihood of a dispute
concerning material facts, and the strong policy underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring a decision on the
merits .4
When the court engages in a factor analysis to determine
whether a default should be entered, it should take as true all
the factual allegations in the complaint, except damages.55 For
example, in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter," in
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). A clerk may not enter a default judgment against a
minor or incompetent person. Id.
49 FED. R. CIv. P. 55(b)(2).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)(A)-(D). The court may not enter a default judgment
against a minor or incompetent person unless the minor or incompetent person is
represented by a guardian or other fiduciary. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Moreover, if
the defendant has previously, personally, or by representative, appeared, then the
defendant or its representative must be served with at least seven days' notice
before the hearing. Id.
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
52 Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Nev. 1993). The discretionary
power for entering a default judgment is implicitly granted because of the
discretionary power a judge has in setting aside a default judgment in Rule 55(c)
and because the plaintiff must apply to the court for entry of a default judgment. Id.
at 1356 n.4.
53 Id. at 1356.
5 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (D. Ariz. 2006).
55 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
56 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065.
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determining whether the default judgment should be granted,
the court accepted as true all the factual allegations in the
complaint.17  The court concluded that: (1) the plaintiff would
suffer prejudice if default judgment was denied because it would
be without recourse for recovery; (2) the plaintiff had adequately
stated a claim on which it could recover; (3) the amount in
controversy was proportionate to the defendant's conduct; (4) the
possibility of a dispute concerning material facts was small
because the defendant had made no attempt to appear in the
case; (5) the default was most likely not due to excusable neglect;
and (6) the defendant's failure to answer the complaint made a
decision on the merits impractical.5 8 Based on these factors, the
court granted the plaintiffs motion for a default judgment. 9
A default judgment under Rule 55(b) is considered
conclusive, like any other judgment on the merits, and is
appealable °.6  "A defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiffs
well-pleaded allegations of fact," and the defendant is barred
from contesting these facts on appeal. 1 On appeal, however, a
defendant may contest the sufficiency of the complaint.62
Moreover, like any other judgment, a default judgment is void if
there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction.63
5, See id. at 1070.
18 See id. at 1070-72.
69 Id. at 1073.
60 See United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 163 (1st Cir.
2004).
61 Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307
(11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id.
63 See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 138 (2d Cir.
2011). The determination of whether a default judgment is void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction usually is only seen on a motion to set
aside the judgment or on enforcement of the judgment with another court. See, e.g.,
Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, 671 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming
the district court's denial to set aside the default judgment for lack of personal or
subject matter jurisdiction); Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G., 629 F.2d 730,
731 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming the district court's decision to grant relief from a
default judgment in an enforcement proceeding for lack of personal jurisdiction); see
also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3.
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C. The Procedure for Setting Aside Rule 55 Defaults and Default
Judgments
Rule 55(c) provides the process for a defendant to set aside a
default or default judgment.' An entry of a default by the clerk
may be set aside for "good cause" under Rule 55(c).65 To
determine whether "good cause" exists, courts consider a number
of factors. These factors tend to center around the public policy
in favor of a judgment on the merits.66 Some of these factors
include whether the defendant had a meritorious defense,
whether the defendant acted with reasonable promptness,
whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced, whether there is a
history of dilatory action, whether less drastic sanctions are
available, and whether the defendant engaged in culpable
conduct .67
Under Rule 55(c), a default judgment, like any other final
judgment, can be set aside pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 60(b), which addresses relief from a judgment or
order.68 A motion to set aside a default judgment is not the
equivalent of an appeal, and a defendant should also file a timely
appeal.6 9  The factors the court evaulates in setting aside an
entry of default are generally the same factors the court
evaluates in setting aside a default judgment;70 however, the
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) ("The court may set aside an entry of default for good
cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).").
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Payne ex rel. Estate of Caldaza v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204-05 (4th
Cir. 2006); FOC Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l City Commercial Capital Corp., 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2009) (noting that the factors are interpreted in favor
of setting aside default).
67 Payne, 439 F.3d at 204-05; FOC Fin. Ltd. P'ship, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1082,
1085. In FOC Financial Ltd. Partnership, the court found "good cause" to set aside
the default against the defendant. See 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. The court found:
(1) that the defendant's failure to file a timely answer was not culpable conduct
because it was not intentional and the defendant had cooperated with discovery;
(2) that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced by setting aside the default because the
default had caused no delay other than the parties having to file additional briefs;
and (3) that the defendant had a meritorious defense because the defendant had
potential defenses to the claims brought against it. See id. at 1083-84.
61 FED R. CIV. P. 55(c).
69 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2692 (noting that the defendant can lose
the right to appeal if it is not timely made).
10 See TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[The] three factors derived from the 'good cause' standard that governs the lifting
of entries of default ... govern the vacating of a default judgment.. . as well."). For
example, in Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc., the
20141
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court conducts a more rigorous review in the latter case. 71 The
most common grounds for setting aside a default judgment under
Rule 60(b) are usually for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; ... the judgment is void; ... or any other
reason that justifies relief."72 A district court's denial of a motion
to set aside either default under Rule 55(c) or default judgment
under Rule 60(b) is reviewable on appeal.7" The standard of
review on appeal of this denial is abuse of discretion.74
A default judgment is also appealable.7 5 Though rarely done,
a defendant may directly appeal the default judgment instead of
seeking to vacate the entry of default or the default judgment.76
On appeal from a default judgment, the court can review both the
entry of default and the final default judgment.77 The standard
of review on appeal of an entry of a default judgment is abuse of
discretion.78
court found that the defendant failed to meet its burden in showing that any of the
factors favored setting aside the default judgment. 375 F.3d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir.
2004). First, the defendant engaged in culpable conduct when the defendant received
notice of the filing of the action but failed to file an answer. Id. at 926. Second, the
defendant did not present sufficient facts, only conclusory statements, to constitute a
meritorious defense. Id. Third, prejudice to the plaintiff existed because any delay in
judgment would allow the defendant to hide its assets, and the defendant showed no
behavior that indicated that it was willing and able to resolve the dispute. Id. at
926-27.
71 See Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 918 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring); see also First Interstate Bank of Okla., N.A. v. Serv. Stores of Am., Inc.,
128 F.R.D. 679, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1989) ("Relief from an entry of default will be
granted more readily and with a lesser showing than in the case of a default
judgment.").
72 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2695. Other
grounds for setting aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) are discovery of
new evidence that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence in time
to move for a new trial; fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct on the part of an
opposing party; or the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or applying it going
forward no longer serves an equitable purpose. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
73 Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 653 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2011).
74 Id.
15 United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 2004).
76 City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir.
2011).
77 Id. at 129.
78 Swarna v. A1-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 2010).
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D. Sanctions Are Available as an Alternative to Rule 55 Default
Judgments
Not all default judgments are entered under Rule 55.79 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain provisions that allow an
entry of default judgment against a party as a sanction.80 A
default judgment can be entered against a party that fails to
appear or participate in a scheduling or pretrial conference, or
that fails to obey a pretrial order.8 ' A default judgment can also
be entered against a party that fails to obey discovery orders.8 2
Moreover, a court has statutory and inherent powers to sanction
parties that act in bad faith. 8 Depending on which jurisdiction
the action is brought in, the alternate provisions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent and
statutory powers may provide for an alternative path for
sanctioning a defendant that fails to "otherwise defend."84
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 37 provide for
sanctions for failure to comply with these rules.8 5 Under Rule 16,
a court on its own or on motion, may issue a sanction if a party or
its attorney fails to appear at a pretrial conference, fails to
participate in good faith at the conference, or fails to obey a
pretrial order. 6 Under Rule 37, a court may issue sanctions for
failure to obey or permit a discovery order.8 7 Sanctions under
'9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), (d)(3).
80 See id.
81 FED. R. CIv. P. 16(f).
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), (d)(3).
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
(holding that the court's inherent powers to sanction bad-faith conduct may still
subject a party to sanctions even though such conduct does not fall within the reach
of certain statutory provisions).
8 Some acts, like failing to appear at a pretrial conference or failing to
participate in discovery, are interpreted to fall within the meaning of Rule 55's
'otherwise defend." See infra Part II.A-B.
85 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A). Sanctions were added to Rule 16 to prevent
dependence on other rules or the court's inherent powers to impose sanctions for
failing to comply with Rule 16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
Sanctions under Rule 37 are to deter those from failing to comply with discovery
orders and to penalize conduct that warrants a sanction. See Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980).
86 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
87 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (d)(3).
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Rule 16 and Rule 37 can include a stay of the proceeding, a
dismissal of the action or proceeding, or an entry of a default
judgment.8
Courts also have statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
to impose sanctions against an attorney who "unreasonably and
vexatiously" multiplies the proceedings.8 9 Sanctions may be in
the form of "excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of [the unreasonable and vexatious]
conduct."90 Courts have entered sanctions when an attorney's
"unreasonable and vexatious" conduct included failure to appear
at trial,91 interference with the discovery process,9 2 and failure to
prosecute. 93 An award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 should only be
made against an attorney when there is a serious disregard for
the orderly process of justice, which the courts consider an
"extreme standard."94 The standard of review on appeal of
sanctions is abuse of discretion. 9
In addition to authority vested in courts under
28 U.S.C. § 1927, courts also have inherent power to sanction
parties and their attorneys.96 This inherent power stems from a
court's necessity to manage its own affairs so that it may resolve
trials in an organized and prompt manner.97 Courts exercise this
s8FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A), (d)(3).
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
90 Id.
91 See Morrison v. Int'l Programs Consortium, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 53, 59
(D.D.C. 2003) (imposing monetary sanctions on defendant's lawyer for multiplying
the proceedings by knowingly and intentionally failing to appear at trial); Rathburn
v. Warren City Sch. (In re Ruben), 825 F.2d 977, 990 n.13 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[Flailure
to appear for trial may, in a proper case, result in a sanction under
28 U.S.C. § 1927 .. ").
92 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1995)
(affirming sanctions imposed on plaintiffs counsel for instructing the witness not to
answer questions).
9' See Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1381 (5th Cir. 1979), affd
sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (upholding the district
court's finding of deliberate and vexatious conduct where plaintiffs' attorneys totally
and deliberately failed to prosecute and abide by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
White v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).
95 Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009).
9 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been
understood that '[clertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with
in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.' ").
97 Id.; Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2000).
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power when a party or attorney acts in "bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."98 Judges recognize that the
"threshold for the use of inherent power sanctions is high."99
Moreover, since inherent power is not subject to democratic
control, courts must act prudently and with discretion when
using their power to sanction a party. 100
Under its inherent powers, a court has discretion in
determining the proper sanction to impose for conduct that
abuses the judicial process. 10 1 Sanctions can be as severe as the
"outright dismissal" of a lawsuit or as minor as the imposition of
attorney fees. 10 2 Sanctions can also be in the form of a default
judgment.10 3 A court uses its inherent powers to sanction parties
and their attorneys when they fail to appear at trial0 4 and when
they engage in misconduct during the discovery process. 105 The
standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion.
0 6
II. THE DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF "OTHERWISE DEFEND"
BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
While the Supreme Court has specifically addressed inherent
powers, 10 7 it has not addressed how to interpret "otherwise
defend" in Rule 55(a). As a result, no uniform interpretation of
" Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 766. To determine whether a party or
attorney acts in bad faith, there must be "clear evidence that the challenged actions
are entirely without color," and the conduct was engaged in for "reasons of
harassment or delay or for other improper purposes," and there was a "high degree
of specificity" in the lower court's factual findings regarding the reasons for imposing
sanctions. Revson, 221 F.3d at 78.
99 Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Elliott v. Tilton, 64
F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995)).
100 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44; Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 764.
101 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45.
102 See id. at 45.
103 Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
104 See Morrison v. Int'l Programs Consortium, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 53, 59
(D.D.C. 2003).
105 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d
Cir. 2002) (stating that the district court has discretion in determining what
sanction to impose on a party who fails to produce evidence during discovery); Wyle
v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 1983) (dismissing the
plaintiffs complaint for failure to abide by the court's discovery orders).
106 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 55.
107 See id. at 35 (examining the extent to which the district court may use its
inherent powers to sanction a party for bad-faith conduct and finding that the
district court properly used discretion under its inherent powers to impose a
sanction of attorney fees and related expenses).
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"otherwise defend" exists. Part II of this Note discusses the
federal circuits' differing approaches on how to interpret
"otherwise defend."10 8  Section A discusses the broad
interpretation of "otherwise defend" adopted by the majority of
these circuits. Section B discusses the minority's narrow
interpretation of "otherwise defend."
A. A Majority of Federal Circuit Courts Broadly Interpret
"Otherwise Defend"
The majority of federal circuits-the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits-faced with the issue of
interpreting Rule 55 have stated that the failure to "otherwise
defend" is broader than the failure to plead. 109 Accordingly, the
majority of circuits interpret "otherwise defend" broadly to
encompass entry of default against parties that answer a
complaint but fail to appear at trial or participate in pretrial
proceedings.110 The majority has explicitly rejected the minority's
narrow interpretation of "otherwise defend.""'
According to the majority's broad interpretation, a
defendant's failure to appear at trial can result in entry of
default.12 The majority considers "[t]he failure to plead ... no
greater an impediment to the orderly progress of a case than is
the failure to appear at trial." 3 Further, the judge must have
broad discretion to impose a sanction of default for failure to
attend trial because the judge is responsible for the "orderly and
expeditious conduct of litigation.""'
108 To date, the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the
interpretation of "otherwise defend."
109 See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir.
1992) (collecting cases).
110 See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 129-31 (2d
Cir. 2011); Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir.
1996); Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l, Inc., 982
F.2d 686, 692-93 (1st Cir. 1993); Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 918; Home Port Rentals,
Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1992); Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d
1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1989).
I" See, e.g., Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d at 131 ("[Tlhis interpretation of
Rule 55 has not been embraced by this Court. Nor has it found favor in a majority of
our sister circuits." (citations and footnote omitted)).
112 See, e.g., Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 918.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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As a result, a default is entered against a defendant that
fails to appear at trial, because it is fair to do so. 1 ' For example,
in Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.,116 the defendants
answered the complaint but failed to produce documents or
respond adequately to discovery requests.11 ' The defendants also
did not respond timely to the court's pretrial memorandum
order.118  When the trial date came, the defendants did not
appear. '1 9 The clerk entered a default against the defendants
under Rule 55.120 The Third Circuit affirmed the entry of default,
because it seemed fair that if a clerk could enter a default after a
party failed to plead, a clerk should be allowed to enter a default
after a party failed to appear at trial.
121
A court's power to maintain an orderly docket warrants the
entry of a default against a defendant that does not appear at
trial. 1 22 For example, in Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health
Clubs, Inc.,123 the defendant failed to appear at trial after it was
adjourned to the next day, and he subsequently failed to send
anyone in his place or notify the court. 124 The court found that
the entry of default against the defendant was proper.'2 5 The
court held that the trial court judge had "broad latitude" to enter
a default against a party that fails to appear at trial because
such conduct jeopardizes "orderly and
expeditious ... litigation."126
Under the majority's broad interpretation, failing to appear
at trial is not the only reason why a default can be entered
against a defendant for failing to "otherwise defend." For
example, in Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben,127 the defendants
did not respond to certified notices sent by the court, did not
appear at the show-cause hearing, and did not participate in
115 See id.
116 980 F.2d 912.
117 See id. at 915-16.
,18 See id. at 916.
119 See id. at 916-17.
120 See id. at 917.
121 See id. at 918.
122 Id.
123 786 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986).
124 See id. at 63.
125 See id. at 64.
126 Id.
127 957 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1992).
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discovery. 28  The Fourth Circuit held that the entry of default
was proper because there was ample evidence in the record to
show that the defendants failed to defend. 129
Failing to respond to a court's order can also result in an
entry of default. 3° For example, in Eagle Associates v. Bank of
Montreal,3 ' defaults were entered against both the defendant
partnership and the defendant partners.'32  A default was
entered against the defendant partnership because it failed to
appear at a court ordered status conference. 33  Similarly, a
default was entered against the defendant partners after they
did not appear at scheduled conferences.'34 The Second Circuit
found that a "cavalier disregard" for a court order falls within the
meaning of Rule 55(a). 135 Accordingly, the entry of default was
proper because the defendants "willfully disregarded" the district
court's orders. 136
Similarly, in Cotton v. Slone,'37 a default was entered after
the defendant failed to comply with the district court's order.138
The defendant answered the complaint and actively participated
in discovery, 39 but failed to comply with the court's order
regarding a joint pretrial memorandum. 40 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's entry of default.14 '
B. A Minority of Federal Circuit Courts Narrowly Interpret
"Otherwise Defend"
Unlike the majority of circuits, the minority of circuits-the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits-interpret "otherwise defend"
128 See id. at 128-29.
129 Id. at 133.
130 See, e.g., Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1310 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that a default judgment against a defendant who willfully
disregarded the district court's order was proper and such conduct constitutes a
failure to otherwise defend).
131 926 F.2d 1305.
132 See id. at 1306.
133 See id. at 1307.
134 See id.
135 Id. at 1310 (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Cont'l Record Co., 386 F.2d
426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967)).
136 Id.
137 4 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 1993).
138 Id. at 179.
139 Id. at 178.
140 Id. at 179.
141 Id. at 181.
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narrowly and will not enter a default against a defendant if that
defendant has answered the complaint. 142  The minority
interprets "otherwise defend" to encompass attacks on service or
motions to dismiss, which prevent a default without pleading on
the merits. When a defendant answers a complaint, the "issue
has been joined," and a default cannot be entered.'4 Instead of
entering a default, the court will let the plaintiff present its case
at the trial despite the absent defendant. 145 If the plaintiff proves
all of the elements of its claim, a judgment will be entered in its
favor. 146
If a defendant fails to appear at trial, a default will not be
entered against the defendant so long as the defendant has
answered the complaint. 147 For example, in Bass v. Hoagland,4 '
neither the defendant nor his attorney showed up at the trial.
149
The Fifth Circuit found that a default could not be entered
against the defendant because the defendant had answered the
complaint and the case was not confessed.' 50 Despite the absent
defendant, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove his
case at trial.15 1 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for the case to proceed to trial.'52
Unlike the majority, the minority will not enter a default
pursuant to Rule 55(a) against a defendant that fails to
participate in pretrial proceedings. 53  In Fogerty v. Condor
Guaranty, Inc. (In re Condor Insurance Ltd.),154 the court held
that an entry of default was improper against a party that
answered the complaint but failed to appear at any of the status
142 See, e.g., Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d
1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1986); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949).
14' Bass, 172 F.2d at 210.
144 Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., 803 F.2d at 1134.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 See Bass, 172 F.2d at 210.
148 172 F.2d 205.
1'9 Id. at 207.
150 Id. at 210.
151 Id.
152 See id. at 210-11 (finding that "judgment for the plaintiff ought not to have
been entered on the pleadings in the present case, and that the truth of the answer
ought to be tried.").
1'3 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Condor Guar., Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), Ch. 15 Case
No. 07-51045-NPO, Adv. No. 07-05049-NPO, slip op. at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 5,
2012).
154 Ch. 15 Case No. 07-51045-NPO, Adv. No. 07-05049-NPO, slip op. at *3.
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conferences or hearings.155  The court reasoned that the
defendant did not meet the minimum procedural requirements
needed to satisfy the entry of default because the defendant had
answered the complaint; therefore, the default was not
entered. 156
Under the minority's narrow interpretation, a default
judgment can still be entered against a defendant for failure to
appear at a pretrial proceeding, but under Rule 16(f), which
concerns scheduling and management, not Rule 55.157 For
example, in SEC v. First Houston Capital Resources Fund, Inc.,"'8
the judge entered a default judgment after the defendant failed
to appear at a pretrial conference. 5 9 The defendant sought to
vacate the default judgment but was denied.160 On appeal, the
court noted that it was unclear whether the default judgment
was entered under Rule 16 or Rule 55.161 The court stated that
the appropriate rule to enter the default judgment under was
Rule 16 because that rule provided for sanctions for failing to
appear at a pretrial conference. 16
2
III. "OTHERWISE DEFEND" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BROADLY
Part III of this Note argues that the majority's broad
interpretation of "otherwise defend" should be adopted as the
uniform interpretation. First, the statutory interpretation of
Rule 55(a) supports a broad interpretation of "otherwise defend."
Second, the purpose behind default judgments and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure supports a broad interpretation of
"otherwise defend." Third, Rule 55 default judgment
alternatives-the court's rule-based, statutory, and inherent
155 See id. at *3-4 ("According to the Fifth Circuit, Rule 55 'does not require that
to escape default the defendant must not only file a sufficient answer to the merits,
but must also have a lawyer or be present in court when the case is called for a
trial.'" (quoting Bass, 172 F.2d at 210)).
156 Id. at *4.
157 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f); SEC v. First Hous. Capital Res. Fund, Inc., 979 F.2d
380, 381 (5th Cir. 1992).
158 979 F.2d 380.
159 Id. at 381.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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powers-are insufficient to protect a diligent party's rights and
ensure compliance with the judicial process if the minority's
narrow interpretation is adopted.
A. Statutory Interpretation Supports a Broad Interpretation of
"Otherwise Defend"
The Supreme Court has provided guidance on how to
interpret language in a statute. 163 The first step is to determine
whether the language at issue has a "plain and unambiguous
meaning" with regard to the particular dispute in the case."M
The Court has held that "It]he plainness or ambiguity of [a
statute] is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole."'65 If the statute is plain and
unambiguous, then the statute must be applied according to its
terms. 166
1. The Language Itself and the Specific Context in Which the
Language of Rule 55(a) Is Used Supports a Broad
Interpretation of "Otherwise Defend"
The meaning of "otherwise defend" in Rule 55(a) is plain and
unambiguous. 167  To "defend" means (1) "[t]o deny, contest, or
oppose (an allegation or claim)," or (2) "[t]o represent (someone)
163 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should be treated like a statute for purposes of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123
(1989) (applying principles of statutory interpretation to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350-61 (1981) (applying
general rules of statutory interpretation to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68).
164 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340.
165 Id. at 341.
166 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325,
1330 (2011) (quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006))
("[I]nterpretation of this phrase 'depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis.' "); see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379,
387 (2009); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 (7th ed. 2007) (providing that the duty of
interpretation does not arise when the language is plain and only has one possible
meaning).
167 Cf. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388 (finding the word 'now" unambiguous after
considering the rest of the language of the Act in question and analyzing the
dictionary definition of "now").
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
as an attorney.""16  Using this plain meaning of Rule 55(a),
failure to "otherwise defend" encompasses failure to appear at
trial or pretrial conferences because the party is not there "to
deny, contest, or oppose" the claim against it, and no attorney is
at the trial or pretrial conference to represent that party.
Moreover, the specific context in which "otherwise defend" is
used in Rule 55(a) suggests that the failure to "otherwise defend"
is broader than the failure to plead.169 According to one of the
statutory canons of construction, "words separated by [a]
disjunctive are intended to convey different meanings unless the
context indicates otherwise." 7 ' Since "plead" and "otherwise
defend" are separated by the word "or," the latter should
encompass a broader range of acts than the former. 71
The 2007 advisory committee's note to Rule 55 also sheds
light on the specific context in which "otherwise defend" is
used. 72 In 2007, Rule 55(a) was changed stylistically to remove
the text "as provided by these rules."7 ' This text was removed to
prevent the confusion that a default should be entered against a
party that showed an intent to defend, but did not do so in a way
specifically provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.174  The advisory committee noted that acts that
showed intent to defend, including those not specifically
described in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, frequently
prevent an entry of default. 17  The advisory committee did not
provide examples of what those acts were. However, acts like
appearing at trial are not specifically described in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 76
168 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009).
169 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1992).
170 See, e.g., Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2007); 1A SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 166, § 21:14 ("[T]erms joined by the disjunctive 'or' must have
different meanings because otherwise the statute or provision would be
redundant.").
171 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (entering a default when a party has "failed to plead
or otherwise defend" (emphasis added)).
172 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 166, § 48:11 (stating that "[i]n the
interpretation[, ... the reports of these committees.., are considered valuable
aids.").
173 FED. R. Civ. P. 55 advisory committee's note.
174 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 55 advisory committee's note.
176 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 37, 55 (providing for sanctions for actions such as
failure to participate in pretrial proceedings, failure to obey discovery orders, and
failure to plead, but not for failure to appear at trial).
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Appearing at trial shows intent to defend and would prevent
an entry of default, absent other circumstances. 7 If a defendant
does not appear at trial, that action-or lack thereof-is
incapable of showing an intent to defend. 78 Moreover, the intent
to defend is not a static concept and can change over time. 79 For
example, while initially answering the complaint can show intent
to defend, when the defendant later fails to appear at pretrial
conferences or trial, those actions can show a failure to defend.8 0
2. The Broader Context of Rule 55(a) Within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Supports a Broad Interpretation of
"Otherwise Defend"
Like the language itself and the specific context in which
"otherwise defend" is used, the broader context of Rule 55 within
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports the majority's
broad interpretation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not provide a special provision for imposing sanctions against a
defendant that does not appear at trial; however, they do provide
for entering a sanction of default against a party that has failed
to participate in discovery or some other pretrial conference.' 8 '
Surely the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not intend for a party to be sanctioned for failing to participate in
pretrial acts but not to be sanctioned for failing to appear at
trial.8 2  If an interpretation of failure to "otherwise defend"
encompasses failure to appear at trial, this anomalous result
does not occur. Adopting the broad interpretation of "otherwise
defend" ensures that defendants that do not appear at trial will
endure consequences for their actions.
Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a
defendant can move to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. 83
The purpose of Rule 41(b) is similar to the purpose of Rule 55.
Rule 41(b) serves as a "safeguard against delay in litigation and
177 See supra Part II.A.
.7. See supra Part II.A.
179 See supra Part II.A.
180 See supra Part II.A.
181 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A), (d)(3).
182 Construing the rules in a way that does not allow the court to sanction a
party for failing to appear at trial does not "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
183 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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harassment of a defendant.""4 Taking into consideration the
purpose of Rule 41(b), courts have dismissed cases for failure to
prosecute for a broad range of reasons. For example, in DuBose
v. Minnesota,""5 the trial court dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute when the plaintiff failed to appear at a pretrial
conference and the trial itself'8 6
Since a defendant can make a motion for failure to prosecute
when the plaintiff fails to appear at pretrial conferences and
trial, a plaintiff should similarly be allowed to move for entry of
default if the defendant fails to appear at those same stages. If
the purpose behind both of the rules is the same, then the broad
range of reasons for dismissal for failure to prosecute should also
extend to entry of default for failure to "otherwise defend."
Further, if Rules 41(b) and 55(a) are interpreted similarly, the
plaintiff and the defendant in an action will both have equal
rights and remedies should the opposing party fail to appear at
trial or pretrial conferences.
Since the language itself, the specific context in which the
language was used, and the broader context of Rule 55 within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports a broad interpretation
of "otherwise defend" that is plain and unambiguous, the
analysis can stop here.
B. The Purpose of Rule 55 Supports a Broad Interpretation of
"Otherwise Defend"
However, even if the text is considered ambiguous, the
majority's broad interpretation takes into account the purpose of
a default judgment: to protect the diligent party's rights.8 7
Therefore, a default should be available when the non-diligent
party is unresponsive. 188 Moreover, an entry of default in favor of
the diligent party will also promote an efficient and orderly
judicial system. 9
184 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2370; see also United States ex rel. Drake v.
Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhe involuntary dismissal
is an important tool for preventing undue delays and avoiding docket congestion.").
185 893 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1990).
1 See id. at 170-71 (noting that the plaintiff was playing games with the court
by consistently failing to comply with pretrial orders).
187 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
188 See id.
189 Pikofsky v. Jem Oil, 607 F. Supp. 727, 733 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
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If "otherwise defend" is interpreted broadly, then the diligent
party's rights are protected. When the plaintiff appears at a
pretrial conference or trial, and the defendant is not present, the
plaintiff is unsure of whether the defendant will continue to
defend the case and whether the plaintiff will be able to recover
on its claim. 190 If the plaintiff has the remedy to move for entry
of default, then the plaintiff is able to protect its rights.191
Furthermore, the entry of a default for failure to appear at
trial or pretrial conferences results in a more efficient judicial
system. 192 If a defendant is aware that a default will be entered
against it if the defendant does not show up at a pretrial
conference or trial, then the defendant will make every effort to
be there.1 9' The judicial system is more efficient then because
disputes are resolved at the time they were scheduled to be
resolved and are not delayed because of the extra time spent on
default and default judgment motions.1 94
The majority's broad interpretation of Rule 55(a) is
consistent with how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to
be construed. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
"construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
95
Entering a default secures "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination"' 96 of an action because it deters future litigants
from using delay as a legitimate strategic tactic.
97
While default judgments are not favored over judgments on
the merits, 9 8 three procedural protections are in place to ensure
that where a judgment on the merits should be entered, it is.
First, Rule 55 provides a two-step process to enter a default
judgment.' 99 A default judgment is not automatically entered
after a default is entered. Instead, the plaintiff must move for
190 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 31-33, 122-26 and accompanying text.
195 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
196 Id.
197 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67
(D.D.C. 2011) (noting that default judgments are not favored among the modem
courts).
199 See FED. R. Civ. P. 55; New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005).
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entry of a default judgment. 00 Unless the party pleads damages
in a "sum certain," 0 1 the court uses its discretion to determine
whether the default judgment should be entered.0 2 In using its
discretion, the court considers a number of factors, including the
public policy of favoring a judgment on the merits."' The court
also has the ability to conduct a hearing to "establish the truth of
any allegation by evidence" or "investigate any other matter."20 4
Because the entry of a default judgment is subject to discretion, a
protection exists to preserve a judgment on the merits where
appropriate.
Second, even before the default judgment is entered, the
defendant has the opportunity to set aside the default.20 If "good
cause" is found by the court,0 6 the default can be set aside.20 7
Again, the court analyzes a number of factors that center on the
policy of favoring judgments on the merits over default
judgments.0 8
Third, even if a default judgment is entered against a
defendant, the defendant still has the opportunity to set that
judgment aside pursuant to Rule 60(b).2 9 To set aside a default
judgment, the court considers the same factors it does in deciding
whether to set aside a default, including the policy of favoring a
judgment on the merits over a default judgment.21 0 While the
standard for vacating a default judgment is higher than for
vacating an entry of default,21 ' a protection still exists to protect
the policy of favoring a judgment on the merits.
200 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b).
201 FED. R. Civ. P. at 55(b)(1) ("If the plaintiffs claim is for a sum certain or a
sum that can be made certain by computation, the clerk ... must enter judgment for
that amount and costs ... ." (emphasis added)).
202 FED. R. CIv. P. 55(b)(2) ("In all other cases, the party must apply to the court
for a default judgment." (emphasis added)).
203 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
204 FED. R. CIv. P. 55(b)(2)(C)-(D).
200 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (providing that an entry of default may be set aside for
"good cause").
206 See id.; see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
factors analyzed to determine whether "good cause" is found).
207 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
208 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
209 See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
210 See TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[The] three factors derived from the 'good cause' standard that governs the lifting
of entries of default... govern the vacating of a default judgment... as well.").
211 See Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 918 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring); see also First Interstate Bank of Okla., N.A. v. Serv. Stores of Am., Inc.,
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C. The Court's Rule-Based, Statutory, and Inherent Powers Are
Not Adequate Alternatives to Rule 55 Defaults
Adopting the minority's narrow interpretation and relying on
the court's rule-based, statutory, and inherent powers to sanction
a party or attorney is insufficient to protect a diligent party's
rights and ensure compliance with the judicial process. While
Rule 16 and Rule 37 provide for sanctions for some acts that
would constitute "otherwise defend" under the majority's broad
interpretation-including failure to appear at a pretrial
conference or participate in discovery-Rule 16 and Rule 37 do
not provide for sanctions when a party fails to appear at trial.212
Further, Rule 16 and Rule 37 sanctions do not have to be in the
form of a default judgment and are not mandatory.213 On the
other hand, the majority's broad interpretation of "otherwise
defend" covers a wide range of acts, including failure to appear at
trial.214 Since a default must be entered by the clerk if the failure
to "otherwise defend" is shown by affidavit,1 5 a Rule 55 default is
more likely to ensure compliance with the judicial process than
the discretionary sanctions under Rule 16 and Rule 37.
Sanctions under Rule 16 and Rule 37 are also an inadequate
alternative because they serve a different function within the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than entry of default under Rule
55. Sanctions under Rules 16 and 37 are to ensure compliance
with those particular rules.21 6 A default under Rule 55 serves the
broader purpose of protecting a diligent party's rights.1 7 The
majority's broad interpretation of "otherwise defend"
encompasses a larger range of acts than Rules 16 and 37 do,
protecting a diligent party's rights at any stage of litigation, not
just at pretrial conferences or during discovery.
Unlike the court's rule-based power, its statutory or inherent
powers allows it to sanction a defendant for failure to appear at
trial; however, the latter powers are insufficient on their own to
128 F.R.D. 679, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1989) ("Relief from an entry of default will be
granted more readily and with a lesser showing than in the case of a default
judgment.").
212 See FED. R. C1V. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), (d)(3).
213 See id.
214 See supra Part II.A.
215 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
216 FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A), (d)(3).
217 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 2681.
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protect a diligent party's rights. Under the court's statutory and
inherent powers to sanction a party, a showing of "vexatious" or
"bad faith" behavior is required.21 Since the standard for
imposing a sanction under the court's statutory and inherent
powers is a high standard to meet, the diligent plaintiffs rights
are unprotected if the plaintiff is unable to show that the
defendant's behavior met that high standard.219 However, bad
faith is not required to enter a default under Rule 55.220 Under
Rule 55, if the plaintiff shows by affidavit that the defendant
failed to "otherwise defend," the clerk must enter a default.22 '
Further, sanctions under the court's statutory or inherent
powers do not deter parties from being neglectful about attending
trial or other pretrial proceedings.222 Neglect does not meet the
high standard for imposing a sanction under the court's statutory
or inherent powers.223 Interpreting "otherwise defend" broadly
deters that behavior. Encouraging diligent behavior for
attorneys and the parties they represent ensures that all
deadlines are met, resulting in an orderly and efficient judicial
system.224
Moreover, entry of default also allows for the punishment of
both the attorney and the defendant. The defendant is punished
because it is potentially liable for a judgment.225 The attorney is
punished because the attorney's reputation is tainted and the
client's trust is broken.226 Under the court's inherent powers, the
court can sanction the party or the attorney,227 but under
218 See supra Part I.D (discussing the standards needed for the court to exercise
its statutory and inherent powers).
219 See supra Part I.D.
220 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
221 Id.
222 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
223 See Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[R]ecklessness suffices
for § 1927, but bad faith is required for sanctions under the court's inherent
power.... [Ilgnorance or negligence... would not meet the appropriate standard of
either basis for sanctions.").
224 See supra notes 31-32, 115-21 and accompanying text.
225 A default judgment is considered conclusive like any other judgment on the
merits. See United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 163 (1st Cir.
2004).
226 Cf Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 1998)
("[A] lawyer's professional reputation is his stock in trade, and blemishes may prove
harmful in a myriad of ways.").
227 Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The court
has inherent power to sanction parties and their attorneys .... ).
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28 U.S.C. § 1927 a court can only impose sanctions against the
attorney.22 The threat of entry of default is needed to ensure the
parties themselves comply with all stages of litigation. Relying
on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will not deter parties from failing to appear
at trial or at other pretrial proceedings. Interpreting "otherwise
defend" broadly deters both the parties and their attorneys from
engaging in undue delay or harassment.
29
Ultimately, a court can still use its discretion in determining
whether entry of default or a sanction under its statutory or
inherent powers is appropriate. 230  This discretion is important
when failure to appear at trial or participate in other pretrial
proceedings is the fault of the attorney and not of the
defendant.231 Moreover, if a judge wants to preserve a judgment
on the merits, lesser sanctions than a default judgment are
available.232
Adopting the broad interpretation of "otherwise defend"
provides for a bright-line rule, which protects the diligent party's
rights and ensures compliance with the judicial process at any
stage in litigation. Leaving the power to sanction parties who
fail to "otherwise defend" to the court's rule-based, statutory, and
inherent powers is insufficient to protect a diligent party's rights
and ensure compliance with the judicial process. If "otherwise
defend" is interpreted broadly to include failure to appear at
pretrial conferences and trial, an efficient judicial system will
result.
228 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) ("Any attorney ... who so multiplies the
proceedings.., unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct." (emphasis added)).
229 See supra note 24-25 and accompanying text.
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
(recognizing that the court is vested with these powers and cannot waive them).
231 In Morrison v. International Programs Consortium, Inc., the defendants'
attorney failed to appear at trial, and the defendants were unaware of their
attorney's misconduct. 240 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2003). The plaintiff moved for
default judgment. Id. at 54. The court found that a default judgment was too severe
a sanction because it was the defendants' attorney who acted in bad faith, not the
defendants. See id. at 60. The court imposed sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
against the attorney instead. See id.
232 See supra Part I.D (discussing alternatives to default judgments).
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CONCLUSION
A broad interpretation of the language "otherwise defend" in
Rule 55(a) is needed to protect a diligent party's rights and
encourage an efficient and orderly judicial system. The broad
interpretation adopted by the majority of federal circuit courts is
consistent with the text of Rule 55(a) and the underlying purpose
of Rule 55 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the
minority's narrow interpretation is adopted, the court's rule-
based, statutory, and inherent powers are insufficient to protect
a diligent party's rights and ensure compliance with the judicial
system.
Applying the broad interpretation of "otherwise defend" to
the scenario presented at the beginning of this Note leads to the
conclusion that the entry of default is proper. A pretrial brief
was not submitted, and neither the party nor his attorney
appeared at trial. The defendant failed to "otherwise defend,"
and the plaintiff can move for an entry of default. Once the
default is entered, the plaintiff can move for entry of a default
judgment. The entry of a default judgment is not absolute, but
entered in the trial court's discretion. Any concerns that a
judgment would not be entered on the merits are mitigated by
the fact that the party has procedural protections for vacating
the entry of default or default judgment.
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